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APPROVED BY:EUR:JGOODBY

EUR/RPM:SJLEDOGAR

S/S:SESTEINER

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SUBJECT: REMARKS AT THE RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE NATO
MINISTERIAL MEETING - DECEMBER 8, 1977

WE MEET THIS WEEK TO TAKE STOCK OF WHAT WE HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED, TO REVIEW WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO
MAINTAIN OUR COMMON SECURITY AND TO WORK FOR PEACE.

THIS WEEK MARKS THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HARMEL
REPORT. THE MAJOR CONCLUSION OF THAT REPORT IS EQUALLY
VALID TODAY -- THAT TO BE EFFECTIVE, NATO MUST SERVE A
DUAL FUNCTION: TO SECURE THE MILITARY DEFENSE OF THE
ALLIES, AND TO SEEK AN EASING OF TENSIONS THROUGH EAST-
WEST NEGOTIATIONS.

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UNDERLYING THESE PURPOSES WAS THE ASSUMPTION THAT
IF WE GREW STRONGER AND MORE UNITED, IF WE REMAINED
DETERMINED TO PRESERVE OUR VALUES AND OUR SOCIETIES,
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BECOME MORE RESPONSIVE TO OUR
GOAL OF RELAXING EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS INDICATE THE WISDOM OF PURSUING
BOTH ELEMENTS OF OUR STRATEGY. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO
BUILD THEIR MILITARY FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY
SHOW AN INCREASED WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD

CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. TO THE FORMER, WE MUST RESPOND WITH OUR OWN FORCE MODERNIZATION. TO THE LATTER, WE MUST RESPOND WITH PERSISTENCE AND CONTINUING RESOLVE TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF WAR, AS WELL AS WITH CAUTION TO ENSURE THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS ENHANCE OUR COMMON SECURITY.

I WANT TO ADDRESS BOTH OF THESE SUBJECTS TODAY, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONTINUED AND GROWING NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

NATO WAS CREATED TO SECURE OUR DEFENSE AGAINST THE THREAT OF SOVIET DOMINATION. THE NATURE OF THAT THREAT HAS CHANGED TO SOME DEGREE WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, BUT IT CONTINUES TO BE THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN OUR DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE ALLIANCE.

WE IN THE ALLIANCE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT, DESPITE THE EASING OF TENSIONS WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS FUNDAMENTALLY COMPETITIVE. OUR VIEWS ON THE WORLD DIFFER. CONFIDENTIAL

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OUR LONG TERM AIMS ARE CONFLICTING. BUT WE INHABIT THE SAME PLANET, AND THAT NECESSARILY MEANS THAT WE HAVE CERTAIN INTERESTS IN COMMON. COMMON SENSE DICTATES THAT, WHILE PURSUING OUR OWN INTERESTS ENERGETICALLY, WE MUST TRY TO REGULATE THE COMPETITIVE ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP -- TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF WAR AND TO BEGIN TO ADDRESS, IN GREATER COOPERATION, THE GLOBAL PROBLEMS THAT CHALLENGE ALL NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

WE WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT OUR AWARENESS OF THE COMPETITIVE ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP CONVINCES US THAT LASTING PROGRESS -- AND OUR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS -- WILL BEST BE SERVED, NOT BY ABSTRACT DECLARATIONS ABOUT DETENTE, BUT BY SPECIFIC ACTIONS ON CONCRETE PROBLEMS BASED UPON MUTUAL SELF-INTERESTS. AND WHILE WE HOPE THAT THE BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP WILL SHIFT INCREASINGLY TOWARD THE LATTER, BOTH ASPECTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WE SHOULD NOT SHY AWAY FROM DEALING WITH THESE TWO CONFLICTING ELEMENTS AT THE SAME TIME. THERE IS NOTHING INCONSISTENT IN THIS PRAGMATIC APPROACH.

IN THE COMING YEARS, WE MUST CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION THAT ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY A MORE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR ON THE WORLD SCENE. IT MUST LEARN THAT EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT LOCAL INSTABILITY, EITHER

DIRECTLY OR BY PROXY, PRODUCE TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE AT BEST. TIME MAY BE ON OUR SIDE IN THIS EFFORT. THE SOVIET RECORD IN THE THIRD WORLD SHOWS A CONTINUING FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE STRENGTH OF NATIONALISM AND THE URGENCY OF ECONOMIC NEEDS WITHIN DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE RESULTING SERIES OF SETBACKS MAY EVENTUALLY DRIVE HOME THE NECESSARY LESSON MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN OUR EFFORTS AT PERSUASION. WE HAVE NOTED PRSIDENT BREZHNEV'S SUPPORT IN HIS SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 2 FOR A "CODE OF RULES FOR GENUINE RESPONSIBILITY
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IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS." HIS REMARKS MAY INDICATE A GROWING AWARENESS OF THE OBLIGATIONS THE SOVIET UNION MUST BEAR AS A LEADING WORLD POWER.

ANOTHER CHALLENGE, OF PRESSING URGENCY, IS TO FIND WAYS TO BROADEN AND ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION THROUGH NEGOTIATION. AS WE MOVE CLOSER TO EACH OTHER'S VITAL INTERESTS, THIS TASK BECOMES INCREASINGLY COMPLEX. LET ME SPEAK FOR A FEW MOMENTS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.

SALT

WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS, ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN. BEFORE DISCUSSING WHERE WE NOW STAND, LET ME SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT SALT AS A CONCEPT, AND ITS IMPORTANCE.

SALT IS NO LONGER MERELY A NEGOTIATION. IT HAS BECOME A PROCESS, A CONTINUUM. NO SINGLE AGREEMENT CAN PUT A CAP ON THE ARMS RACE NOR DEAL WITH THE MANY POSSIBILITIES FOR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CHANGES THAT MODERN TECHNOLOGY MAKES POSSIBLE.

SALT IS ALSO A PART OF THE LARGER PROCESS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WHILE WE DO NOT DIRECTLY LINK THESE TALKS TO OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS ON OTHER ISSUES, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SALT LIES AT THE HEART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. THIS IS TRUE NOT JUST BECAUSE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE THESE TALKS HAVE ACHIEVED. ALL OF US HERE HAVE ALSO RECOGNIZED THE FACT THAT, WHILE
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SALT CANNOT IN ITSELF GUARANTEE STABILITY IN THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE, SUCH STABILITY MAY BE BEYOND OUR GRASP WITHOUT SALT. ON THE MERITS, THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF SALT WILL HELP DECIDE THE CHANCES FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL.

SO AS EAST-WEST RELATIONS THEMSELVES EVOLVE, OVER THE COMING DECADE THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING, PERHAPS MOVING ON SEVERAL PARALLEL TRACKS AT THE SAME TIME AS DIFFERENT ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED. SALT II AND SALT III WILL BE A PART OF THIS PROCESS, NOT A CONCLUSION TO IT.

IN THINKING ABOUT THIS CONTINUING ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NATO DOCTRINE. OUR COMMON DOCTRINE HAS ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THE LINKS BETWEEN THE OVERALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE, AS EXPRESSED BOTH IN OUR ARSENALS AND IN SALT, AND THE THEATER NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCES. EACH PART IS TIED TO THE OTHER, NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE BUT AS A COMPLEMENT. THUS WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR DETERRENT ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF STRATEGIC, TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES SO THAT THE PACT KNOWS THAT IT CANNOT DEAL WITH THE ALLIANCE PIECEMEAL BUT MUST CONFRONT ALL THE FORCES AT OUR COLLECTIVE DISPOSITION.

SECRET

THUS ALSO, WE MUST DEAL WITH THE OVERLAPPING QUALITY OF THESE SYSTEMS IN THE WAY WE NEGOTIATE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES. THIS ISSUE IS A MATTER OF CONCERN FOR ALL OF US WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. IF THERE IS ONE POINT ABOVE ALL I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE WITH YOU TODAY, IT IS THIS: WE ARE LISTENING TO YOU, WE ARE AWARE OF YOUR CONCERNS, AND WE WISH TO WORK TOGETHER WITH YOU AS WE DEVELOP A SALT NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT OUR MUTUAL CONCERNS ARE MET.

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FROM THE BEGINNING, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS RECOGNIZED THAT OUR APPROACH TO SALT SHOULD ENHANCE WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS AND NOT JUST SPECIAL US SECURITY INTERESTS. OUR CONSULTATIONS -- AND YOUR VIEWS -- HAVE CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO OUR APPROACH ON MANY SALT ISSUES. WE BELIEVE THAT THE AGREEMENT TAKING SHAPE WILL ADVANCE THE OVERRIDING PURPOSE OF OUR ALLIANCE -- TO PRESERVE PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- THE AGREEMENT THAT IS EMERGING WILL STABILIZE THE OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE AND HELP PREVENT POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING DEVELOPMENTS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL REDUCE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY RISKS OF AN UNCONTROLLED STRATEGIC COMPETITION, GIVE IMPETUS TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, AND GENERALLY LOWER THE LEVEL OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

-- IN THE OVERLAPPING AREA BETWEEN THE OVERALL

STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THE THEATER NUCLEAR

BALANCE WE HAVE:

-- SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED SOVIET ATTEMPTS
TO MAKE FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS A SUBJECT
OF SALT;

-- EXCLUDED ALLIED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
FROM CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC
FORCES;

-- PRESSED THE MOST SIGNIFICANT KIND OF
CONSTRAINT ON THE SOVIET BACKFIRE AIR-

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CRAFT THAT THREATENS ALL OF OUR FORCES IN
EUROPE, I.E., NUMERICAL LIMITS; AND

- -- GAINED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO HOLD OPEN OP-
- TIONS ON GROUND AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE
- MISSILES BY RESTRICTING THEIR DEPLOYMENT
- ONLY IN THE THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL, AND WE
- HAVE SEURED AN AGREEMENT FROM THE SOVIETS
- THAT THESE MISSILES MAY BE TESTED AT LONG
- RANGES IN ALL MODES DURING THIS PERIOD.
- WE NEED TO CONSIDER TOGETHER THE FUTURE
- ROLE OF CRUISE MISSILES, IN TERMS OF
- BOTH STRATEGIC STABILITY AND ALLIANCE
- DEFENSE.

-- WE DISCUSSED WITH YOU THE TEXT OF A GENERALIZED
NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION BEFORE IT WAS
TABLED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH YOU
ON THIS QUESTION, RECOGNIZING THE PARTICULAR
INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE MEMBERS IN THIS
SUBJECT.

INDEED, WE WILL NEED TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO DEAL
WITH ALL THE ISSUES I HAVE DISCUSSED -- BOTH IN OUR FORCE
PLANS AND IN FUTURE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS.

AS YOU WILL HAVE GATHERED FROM THE NAC BRIEFINGS,
AMONG THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS IS THE CONTENT OF THE
LAST OF THE THREE ELEMENTS WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE THE
SALT II AGREEMENT -- NAMELY, THE PRINCIPLES AND GUIDE-
LINES FOR SALT III. BECAUSE THIS SECTION OF THE AGREEMENT
FORESHADOWS THE WAY WE WILL TREAT THE INCREASINGLY COMPLEX
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, REACHING AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE EASY. INDEED,
A POSSIBLE OUTCOME IS THAT SOME OF ITS SUBSTANCE WILL
CONSIST OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS OF GOALS.
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I HAVE EMPHASIZED THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SALT PROCESS. BUT I DO NOT WANT TO OBSCURE THE FACT THAT AT THE BASE OF DECISIONS ON SALT LIE COMMON SENSE JUDGMENTS ABOUT HOW BEST TO PRESERVE OUR SECURITY. WE CAN ENGAGE IN ABSTRACT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FIRST-STRIKE SCENARIOS AND VERIFICATION PROBABILITIES. BUT BEHIND EACH OF THESE DISCUSSIONS LIES THE NEED TO MAKE PRACTICAL POLITICAL DECISIONS WHICH INCREASE OUR SECURITY BY REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR.

AS WE WORK TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT THAT SERVES OUR INTEREST, WE ARE GUIDED BY THE VISION OF A WORLD WHERE

WE HAVE CONTROLLED THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE -- WHERE WE ARE MORE SECURE BECAUSE WE HAVE STABILIZED THE COMPETITION, REDUCED NUCLEAR STOCKPILES, AND LIMITED NEW DEVELOPMENTS. BUT WE MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND THE DARKER VISION OF A WORLD WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT -- WHERE THE COMPETITION CONTINUES UNABATED, WITH NEW UNCERTAINTIES, NEW RISKS, AND NEW COSTS.

WITH AN AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE LIMITED TO A MAXIMUM OF 2250 STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND PERHAPS TO 2160. WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT, WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY COULD FIELD CLOSE TO 3000, A 30 PERCENT INCREASE.

-- WITH AN AGREEMENT - 1200 OF THESE MIGHT BE MIRV'D. WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT, AS MANY AS 1900 MIGHT BE MIRV'D.

-- INSTEAD OF SOME 820 SOVIET MIRV'D ICBM'S, THERE COULD BE AS MANY AS 1300, AND PROBABLY NO LESS
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THAN 920. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND THE OVERALL THROWEIGHT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER.

-- WITHOUT A SALT AGREEMENT, MASSIVE EXPENDITURES WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE BALANCE THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT AND THUS THE NAT DETERRENT AS A WHOLE. SEEN IN THIS LIGHT, SALT IS A CHECK TO THE PERCEPTION THAT THE SOVIETS COULD GAIN A NUCLEAR ADVANTAGE WHICH THEY COULD USE TO UNDERMINE OUR DIPLOMACY AND OUR UNITY.

WE MUST DRIVE THE HARDEST BARGAIN THAT WE CAN AND NEVER ACCEPT A BARGAIN THAT DIMINISHES OUR SECURITY. BUT WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND AS WELL THAT THE ABSENCE OF

AN AGREEMENT CAN ONLY MEAN INCREASED COMPETITION AND GROWING RISK.

MBFR

SALT, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE ONLY ITEM OF EAST-WEST BUSINESS CURRENTLY BEFORE THE ALLIANCE. THE STABILITY IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS WE ARE WORKING TOWARDS IN SALT SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY A MORE STABLE EAST-WEST BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS -- APPROXIMATE PARITY AND COLLECTIVE CEILINGS -- REFLECT THESE BROAD ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS

WE NEED TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO GET SATISFACTORY DATA. THE NEW NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE DEVELOPED IN THE ALLIANCE SHOULD, WHEN PRESENTED, BE SEEN BY THE PACT AS A SERIOUS EFFORT TO RESOLVE SOME OF THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN WAYS WHICH PROTECT OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. WE WILL LOOK TO THE SOVIETS FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE THAT WILL MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE.

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NO ONE CAN PREDICT HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT OR EVEN WHAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD ULTIMATELY LOOK LIKE. I DO KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT AS WE TALK IN VIENNA, WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK, AS WE HAVE BEEN, TO MODERNIZE AND STRENGTHEN NATO FORCES, A MATTER I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS MORE FULLY IN A MOMENT. AS WE SEEK TO NEGOTIATE A BALANCE AT THE TABLE IN VIENNA, WE MUST WORK TO ACHIEVE IT IN OUR OWN FORCES.

CSCE

AT THE CSCE MEETING IN BELGRADE, THE ALLIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN THEIR INSISTENCE ON AN HONEST REVIEW OF FINAL ACT IMPLEMENTATION. THE CONFERENCE HAS SUCCEEDED IN ENHANCING THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HAS ESTABLISHED THE CSCE AS A FORUM FOR DISCUSSING CONCRETE ISSUES -- MATTERS WHICH AFFECT PEOPLE'S DAILY LIVES. WE HAVE MADE A CLEAR RECORD OF THE AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS IS NECESSARY. IT HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY PROCESS FOR US. IT HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE SOVIETS. BUT WE CAN HOPE THAT THE BELGRADE EXPERIENCE MAY HELP INDUCE MOSCOW TO FACE THE COMMITMENTS OF HELSINKI IN A MORE OPEN WAY.

WE DO NOT SEEK POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS. WE SET NO MODELS FOR OTHERS TO FOLLOW. BUT WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENT WHEN GOVERNMENTS

VIOLATE THE INTERNATIONALLY-ACCEPTED HUMAN RIGHTS OF

THEIR CITIZENS -- RIGHTS THAT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE EVEN BY THOSE WHO VIOLATE THEM IN PRACTICE.

THE CSCE IS VIRTUALLY UNIQUE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL

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DIPLOMACY. IT IS ACQUIRING A LIFE OF ITS OWN -- ALONG LINES NOT ENTIRELY FORESEEN AT HELSINKI. IT WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE. AS IT DOES, IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN BELGRADE AND THE NEXT MEETING, WE MUST MAINTAIN PRESSURE FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT.

CSCE IS LIKELY TO BE A MAJOR POLITICAL FACTOR IN EUROPE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. UNTIL NOW, WE HAVE STRESSED THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF FINAL ACT COMMITMENTS. NOW, WE NEED TO LOOK AT THIS PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR LONG-TERM POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THE CSCE CAN BE A USEFUL FORUM FOR THRASHING OUT A WIDE ARRAY OF EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES THAT RESULT FROM 30 YEARS OF COLD WAR. IT IS TIME THAT WE CLEARED AWAY MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS. THIS APPROACH WILL REQUIRE FRANK EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WITH THE SOVIETS; WE SHOULD NOT SHY AWAY FROM THAT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST APPROACH THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE AND HOW IT FITS TOGETHER WITH THE BEST OF OUR POLICIES TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET

EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. FINALLY, WE MUST UNDERTAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO MAKE OUR APPROACH TO CSCE UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE PUBLIC, IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.

IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS CLEARLY THE CONTRIBUTION

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OF CSCE TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE. CHANGE CAN PRODUCE BACKLASH AND COUNTER-REACTION. WE MUST PROCEED WITH CARE, SEEKING TO FOSTER A PEACEFUL CHANGE OF ATTITUDES IN COUNTRIES WHOSE LEADERS DO NOT SHARE OUR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. FOR OUR PART, HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED OVER THE LONG HAUL TO THE CSCE PROCESS, AND TO ITS RESULTS. AS WE PROCEED, THERE MUST BE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES. THE WORK DONE AMONG THE EC-9 AND WITHIN THE NATO FORUM, HAS GREATLY ASSISTED THE FORMULATION OF THE WEST'S POLICY. THAT COOPERATION MUST CONTINUE

IF OUR PARTICIPATION IN CSCE IS TO HAVE A LASTING
BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON PEOPLE'S LIVES.

NATO DEFENSE

OUR APPROACH TO THESE EAST-WEST TALKS, AS WELL AS
TO THE OTHER IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TAKING
PLACE--ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, THE INDIAN OCEAN,
A CHEMICAL-WEAPONS CONVENTION, CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS, AND OTHERS -- ARE, AND MUST BE, PREDICATED
UPON THE STRENGTH OF WESTERN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
THE FIRM AND UNEQUIVOCAL CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT.

DETERRENCE DEPENDS ON A SATISFACTORY OVERALL
BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES AT ALL LEVELS BETWEEN NATO
AND THE WARSAW PACT. DETERRENCE IS BASED ULTIMATELY
ON BOTH CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY -- UNCERTAINTY THAT
AN ATTACK WOULD SUCCEED, UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ESCALATION,
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE ULTIMATE RISK OF AGGRESSION --
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AND CERTAINTY OF OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE AND OUR COMMIT-
MENT TO FORWARD DEFENSE. NATO, AS AN ALLIANCE, MUST
MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH AND THE WILL TO PREVENT THE
WARSAW PACT FROM ASSUMING THAT AN ATTACK ON THE TERRI-
TORY OF A NATO MEMBER WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL.

WE MUST MAINTAIN A POWERFUL AND READY FRONT-LINE
FORCE IN EUROPE, BACKED BY REINFORCEMENTS WHICH CAN
BE RAPIDLY DEPLOYED. THE DEFENSE MINISTERS HAVE JUST
DISCUSSED OUR EFFORTS TO CONSTRUCT A LONG-TERM PROGRAM
OF DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS. SECRETARY BROWN, FOR OUR PART,
HAS REPORTED ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING TO
IMPROVE AMERICAN COMBAT FORCES IN EUROPE. THIS
ALLIANCE HAS, WITHOUT QUESTION, THE ABILITY TO FIELD
AN ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCE.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR DOING THAT IS AMPLY CLEAR.
IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE WARSAW PACT IS STEADILY MODER-
NIZING ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND HAS GREATLY
STRENGTHENED ITS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. QUALITATIVE
IMPROVEMENTS IN FIREPOWER, MOBILITY, AND CONTROL OF
FORCES CAN MAKE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE BALANCE
OF POWER. THE SIDE THAT EXPLOITS THESE DEVELOPMENTS
MOST EFFECTIVELY WILL HAVE THE ADVANTAGE. WE CAN SEIZE
THAT OPPORTUNITY. OUR ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MAN-
POWER RESOURCES ARE FAR SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF OUR POTEN-
TIAL ADVERSARY.

IMPROVING OUR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES WILL REQUIRE
A MORE EFFICIENT USE OF OUR RESOURCES, BETTER ORGANIZA-
TION, AND BETTER TRAINING. IT WILL TAKE INCREASED

LEVELS OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN REAL TERMS. WE ALL MUST INVEST IN MODERN EQUIPMENT, AND WE MUST ALL PLAN THIS INVESTMENT MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN IN THE PAST TO RATIONALIZE THE OVERALL NATO DEFENSE EFFORT. WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD THE LUXURY OF ACQUIRING FORCES AND
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EQUIPMENT WITHOUT REGARD TO WHAT OUR ALLIES ARE ACQUIRING. BY WORKING MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER WE CAN HOLD DOWN COSTS AND ENABLE OUR ARMED FORCES TO FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER.

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PLEDGED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES TO THE DEFENSE OF NATO. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FEEL THIS COMMITMENT DEEPLY, BUT THEY ARE ALSO AFFECTED BY WHAT THEY SEE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE CONTRIBUTING TO THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. THE DEFENSE OF THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PERCEIVED BY AMERICANS TO BE AS IMPORTANT TO OUR ALLIES AS IT IS TO US.

ACROSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES I HAVE DISCUSSED, THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER IS GREATER THAN EVER BEFORE. WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER TOLD THE LONDON SUMMIT LAST MAY THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE LIES AT THE HEART OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, HE WAS EXPRESSING NOT ONLY THE CONTINUITY OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT, BUT ALSO AN INESCAPABLE FACT OF LIFE. TODAY, NO LESS THAN WHEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS SIGNED, THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF EUROPE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THAT OVERRIDING REALITY DIRECTS OUR COURSE AS WE BUILD FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

CONCLUSION

IT IS PART OF THE WESTERN TRADITION TO BE WARY OF DOGMATISM. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRESENT IS CLOUDY ENOUGH; WHEN IT COMES TO THE FUTURE, IT IS DIM INDEED. IN FOREIGN, AS IN DOMESTIC POLICY, WE CAN BEST SERVE
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OUR PRINCIPLES BY PURSUING THEM ON A PRACTICAL BASIS, ANTICIPATING PROBLEMS WHERE WE CAN AND RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES AS THEY ARISE. IN THIS PROCESS, COLLECTIVE WISDOM IS SUPERIOR TO INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS. THE

ADVANTAGE OF AN ALLIANCE IS NOT ONLY IN THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF ITS MEMBERS BUT IN THEIR COMBINED JUDGMENT AS WELL.

THIS IS WHY WE VALUE OUR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.
IT IS WHY WE WISH TO INVIGORATE IT, BOTH IN ITS ABILITY
TO MEET MILITARY THREATS AND IN ITS CAPACITY TO REACH
INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON POLITICAL ISSUES. FROM OUR STAND-
POINT, OUR COMMITMENT TO THE TRANSATLANTIC COMPACT
REMAINS THE CORNERSTONE OF AMERICA'S POSTWAR FOREIGN
POLICY. VANCE
UNQUOTE VANCE

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